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For  investors  who  want  to  use  the  securitized  property  market  for  their  international  real  estate 
investments, a number of important issues must be contemplated. In this article, we look at three of 
these issues.  
The first is market size. We examine whether the international securitized real estate equity markets 
are big enough to absorb substantial amounts of investment capital. In order to do this, we look at the 
size of the securitized market, and relate that to the estimated size of the private global equity real 
estate market.  
The second issue is liquidity, which is often used as a reason to use the public equity property markets 
instead of the private markets. Indeed, it is probably almost always easier to buy or sell stocks in 
property companies than it is to buy or sell properties directly. The question is whether liquidity is there 
when you need it: Is it possible to sell the shares of property companies quickly when markets are 
heading  down?  We  address  this  issue  by  looking  at  liquidity  in  time,  and  over  varying  market 
circumstances. In most of the markets we analyze, liquidity, as measured in physical share turnover, 
did not fall during bear markets.  
The  third  and  last  issue  is  pricing  in  the  largest  securitized  property  markets.  We  analyze  the 
relationship between the interest rate and the earnings-price ratio in each of these markets. There 
appears to have been some overreaction in Hong Kong.  
MARKET SIZE: IS IT BIG ENOUGH?  
The  first  question  we  ask is:  Are  the  public  real  estate  markets  big  enough  to  absorb  substantial 
amounts of capital? Especially for very large institutional investors, this is a relevant issue, as they 
have no choice but to go both private and public when the public markets do not have sufficient size to 
be considered a serious investment alternative to private property investment. Exhibit 1 shows the 
development of this market since the mid-1980s. The graph distinguishes Europe, North America, and 
the Far East/Pacific region.  
In the early 1980s, the global property share market had a total capitalization of approximately U.S. 
$25 billion, and this began growing very strongly in the late 1980s. From the graph, it is clear that this 
growth emanated mainly from Europe and the Far East. The North American property share market 
only started growing later. The global property crisis that began in 1989 temporarily hampered the 
growth of the world property share market. Between the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1993, global 
market  capitalization  hovered  around  U.S.  $150  billion.  During  that  period,  the  North  American 
property share market's capitalization was only 20% of the global market.  
This period ended with strong growth in 1993 and 1994. This time, the North American market did play 
an important role in worldwide developments, and, as the graph shows, the European and the Far 
Eastern markets grew as well. As a reaction to the property credit crunch that followed the property 
crisis, new ways of financing real estate had to be found, and the stock market appeared to be the 
perfect vehicle. As a result, the equity REIT market in the U.S. blossomed, and then boomed.  
In the Far East, Hong Kong led the way for a regional boom in the property share markets, and both 
the number of listed companies and their size grew strongly. The market grew from U.S. $27 billion by 
the end of 1992 to U.S. $98 billion in December 1996, amounting to 28% of the total global market 
capitalization. If one considers that Hong Kong GDP is only 2% of world GDP, the magnitude of the 
distortion caused by property securitization in Hong Kong becomes obvious.  The next two years were a period of consolidation, with a global market value of around U.S. $250 
billion. In 1997, growth picked up speed, again led by the U.S. and the Far East. The last distinct 
phase in the recent evolution of this market started in the second half of 1997, with the crisis in the 
Asian financial markets. Market values in North America and Europe, however, were not affected very 
much by the turmoil and remained relatively stable. Currently, the global property share market value 
stands at about U.S. $350 billion, divided about equally among Europe, North America, and the Far 
East.  
Although this is a substantial amount of money, it is probably not much compared with the global stock 
of privately held real estate. To get more insight into this issue, we estimate the value of the global 
stock of private real estate using a method much like the one proposed by Miles et al. [1994]. But while 
they assume a fixed ratio between a country's GDP and its stock of investment assets, we assume a 
different, but also fixed, ratio between a country's GDP and its total commercial real estate assets. The 
ratio equals the value of U.S. GDP divided by the total value of commercial real estate assets in the 
U.S. for 1996, based on the value of U.S. commercial real estate estimated by Miles and Tolleson 
[1997].(n1) We find a total global value of the commercial real estate equity markets of U.S. $11,867 
billion at the end of 1996. At that time, the total market capitalization of public equity real estate was 
approximately $325 billion, or about 2.7% of the private total. From this result we conclude that the 
level of property securitization is not yet very high on a global basis.  
Of course, our estimate represents a global average, and the level of real estate securitization varies 
across countries. As a result, public real estate investment on a serious scale is not an option in all 
countries.  This  means  that  institutional  investors  with  very  specific  demands  in  terms  of  country 
allocation and with very large amounts of investment capital are forced to use both the private and the 
public property markets.  
Nevertheless,  the  global  public  markets  can  offer  significant  advantages  and  opportunities  to  U.S. 
investors. In the next sections, we investigate liquidity and the current attractiveness of specific foreign 
property share markets. We present information regarding all national property share markets, but we 
focus on the six largest: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, France, the U.K., and the U.S.  
LIQUIDITY IS RELIABLE  
One of the most important advantages of investing in the public property markets is liquidity. Buying 
the shares of listed property companies allows investors to adjust their exposure to property in different 
markets quickly if changes in market conditions make this necessary. To gain more insight into this 
issue, we examine stock trading volume in the six biggest property share markets.  
To a large extent, the liquidity of the property share markets is country-driven. Exhibit 2 illustrates this 
point very clearly. The graph shows the average of the annual dollar trading volume divided by the 
dollar market capitalization for each country for the period 1991 through 1998. In effect, the graph 
provides a picture of the monthly physical stock turnover, and thereby demonstrates the ease with 
which an investor can increase or decrease exposure to particular property share markets.  
It is clear that Hong Kong and the U.S. have the highest average volume. Approximately 50% of the 
shares of the average Hong Kong property company are traded each year. For the U.S., this is just 
over 65%. The other liquid market is the U.K., where this percentage is approximately 43%. In Japan 
and Australia, this percentage is about 32%, and in France, where liquidity is much lower, an average 
of  12%  of  shares  is  traded  each  month.  Investors  can  take  this  into  account  when  decisions 
concerning asset allocation are being made. Because the liquid markets are more attractive to invest 
in, they may be overweighted to some extent.  
For institutional investors, a reasonable level of trading volume is especially important in bear markets. 
The only way to manage the risk of a property share portfolio is to adjust its weighting based on market 
expectations. In the current market, property derivative instruments do not exist, so hedging portfolio 
risk  with  such  instruments  is  impossible.  It  is  therefore  imperative  that  portfolio  weights  can  be 
adjusted  quickly  according  to  altering  circumstances  and  expectations,  and,  for  that,  liquidity  is 
essential.  
Current  market  movements  in  the  Far  East  and  the  U.S.  provide  us  with  very  good  information 
pertaining to this issue: If property stock trading volumes do not fall in times of a bear market, the 
property  share  market  clearly  has  a  big  advantage  over  the  private  property  markets,  where,  on occasion,  liquidity  has  all  but  dried  up.  Exhibits  3A  through  3F  provide  monthly  physical  trading 
volumes for the six countries we study for January 1990 through January 1999. Again, the vertical axis 
shows the average percentage of outstanding shares traded in each month.  
The main story the graphs tell is that liquidity does not fall when markets take a dive. For all six 
countries, trading volumes maintained their historic levels. Even in Hong Kong, liquidity held its own 
even when prices fell very sharply. This is a marked contrast with the situation in the direct property 
markets in the Far East, where liquidity has all but dried up. These findings imply that investors willing 
to decrease their exposure to property in these six markets can probably do that at prevailing market 
prices. Thus, the liquidity advantage property shares have over direct property investments holds in 
bull  as  well  as  in  bear  markets,  a  very  important  factor  for  investors  concerned  about  the  risk 
management of their foreign property holdings.  
PRICING  
All this means that an investor in the global public real estate markets can relatively quickly adjust his 
exposure to certain regions or property types. In other words, a timing strategy is possible using these 
investment instruments. With that, the question of which markets are cheap and which markets are 
dear  comes  to  mind.  In  other  words,  how  is  it  possible  to  take  advantage  of  the  performance 
differences between countries?  
There are many ways to answer this question. No single valuation technique has been adopted as the 
standard method to determine the attractiveness of the market for all countries. The U.S. REIT market 
is often analyzed by using an FFO approach, and the European property share analysts frequently use 
some sort of NAV measurement to value property companies.  
Another way to value markets is by looking at their price/earnings (P/E) ratio. A low P/E ratio implies a 
low expected growth in earnings, as investors are only paying a small multiple of the earnings for the 
shares in the company. When investors expect the company to grow fast, the P/E ratio goes up. 
Different countries have different average levels of P/E ratios, which is logical, because the cost of 
acquiring capital in a certain country varies.  
So a simple comparison of the P/E ratios over countries would not suffice in establishing whether a 
certain property market is cheap or dear. But we need not analyze the absolute level of the P/E ratio. 
We can also examine the relative value of the P/E versus the interest rate in a certain country. In doing 
so, we can determine for each country whether the property share market is relatively expensive or 
not. In this article, we compare the inverse of the P/E ratio, the E/P ratio or earnings-price (or, in real 
estate  parlance,  the  capitalization  rate),  with  the  prevailing  interest  rate  in  the  country.  From  this 
calculation, we can determine what the spread is between the cost of the investment (the interest rate) 
and the returns on the investment (the earnings-price). This will tell us which markets are expensive, 
and which markets are cheap.  
First, look at the 1997 price earnings ratios.(n2) In Exhibit 4, the average P/E ratio is plotted for the six 
biggest property share markets worldwide. From the exhibit, the P/E ratio of Japan jumps out, because 
earnings have been very low for the Japanese companies, resulting in a very high P/E ratio for Japan.  
In a historical context, some other markets show surprising exhibits as well. The P/E ratio of the Hong 
Kong shares stood at approximately 8, while only a couple of years ago, the P/E ratio of Hong Kong 
was a multiple of that. Surprisingly, each of the more mature markets, France, the U.K., and the U.S., 
have a relatively high P/E, hovering between 15 and 20. Even when we consider the differences in 
accounting, this is quite high, because it means that investors are expecting a high level of earnings 
growth for the property companies in these markets, and given the fact that they are mature, this may 
not be very likely.  
To get a picture of the development of the earnings-price ratio in time, Exhibits 5A through 5F show 
the earnings-price ratio versus the interest rates for the same six markets. The interest rates are ten-
year swap rates. In some markets, the earnings-price and the interest rate are moving very close to 
one another.  
An  example  of  this  is  the  situation  in  Australia  (Exhibit  5A).  This  implies  that  the  property  share 
markets are fairly priced. For other markets, however, the situation is totally different. Looking at the 
Hong Kong market in Exhibit 5E, we see a spectacular jump in the earnings-price ratio during the crisis that started in July 1997, reflecting the expectation of investors that earnings would fall rapidly. Judging 
by these numbers, the undervaluation of the Hong Kong market still existed at December 1998, but the 
gap between earnings-price and interest rates is rapidly closing.  
Another market that shows a very interesting movement is the U.K., with the earnings-price climbing 
toward the interest rate, and at the moment the two are even crossing. In other words, it looks like the 
property share market in the U.K. could become undervalued.  
Exhibit 5E which shows the development of the Japanese earnings-price ratio over time, shows that 
there have been periods of overvaluation and periods of under-valuation. Since the first months of 
1998, the difference between earnings-price and interest rates has converged. In France (Exhibit 5A), 
the property shares have been overvalued for quite some time. The earnings-price and the interest 
rate move together, but the level of the interest rates is consistently higher than the earnings-price 
ratio.  
The U.S. property share market (Exhibit 5C) has shown a similar pattern of behavior, but, during 1998, 
the  gap  between  the  earnings-price  ratio  and  the  interest  rate  narrowed.  Nevertheless,  and  quite 
surprisingly, even after the strong repricing of the U.S. market, the long-run interest rate is still higher 
than the average earnings-price ratio.  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS  
Over the last fifteen years, the global property share market has shown substantial growth. At the end 
of 1998, the market was worth just over U.S. $350 billion. However, based on our estimate, the level of 
commercial property securitization, as measured by the ratio of public to private commercial property, 
was still under 3%, and this ratio differs a lot across countries. This means that the public commercial 
property markets in different countries do not offer the same opportunities for investment.  
Another key issue for investors who want to use the opportunities of the public property market is 
liquidity. Our research indicates that even when markets are doing poorly, liquidity is still available. 
That means that liquidity is not a mirage; it is really there, and it can help investors with the risk 
management of their portfolios.  
When investors decide to invest internationally there are a number of options available to determine 
which markets are likely to perform well. One way is to compare the earnings-price of markets with 
local interest rates. Applying this criterion, the Hong Kong property share market appears to have been 
strongly undervalued, and, consequently, the likelihood of that market outperforming was extremely 
high.  
Interestingly, this view was at odds with investor sentiment during the middle of 1998, even though it 
was during this period that the gap between the earnings-price ratio and interest rates was sending out 
a strong signal that the property share market had become extremely undervalued. While the gap 
between the earnings-price ratio and interest rates has significantly closed since the market lows in 
1998, the gap between the earnings-price ratio and interest rates still indicates attractive valuations on 
a global relative basis. Conversely, applying the same analysis to the mature markets, the current 
tendency to view these markets as low risk may be somewhat erroneous. Our analysis suggests that 
these markets are the most expensive.  
ENDNOTES  
(n1) The GDP data is from the World Bank [1999], and the global estimate is based on the following 
countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Malaysia,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  the 
Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the U.K., and the U.S.  
(n2) price/earnings ratios are calculated by taking the average of the price/earnings ratios of the ten 
largest  companies  in  each  property  market.  The  prices  taken  are  December  1997  exhibits,  the 
earnings information is the earnings exhibit at the fiscal year-end of each individual company.  
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